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Carbon Markets and their Implications for Natural Resource 








Just as the world must adapt to climate change, it must also adapt to carbon 
markets.  While some industries see carbon markets as a threat, many 
conservationists see a major opportunity.  This paper considers implications of 
carbon markets for natural resource management (NRM) in Australia. There 
are in fact a range of distinct, but overlapping carbon markets.  These range 
from international compliance markets (the Kyoto Protocol flexibility 
mechanisms) through national compliance markets (such as Australia’s 
proposed emissions trading scheme) to unregulated voluntary markets.  While 
NRM is intimately linked to the global carbon cycle, it has a very limited role in 
existing and proposed carbon markets.  The only significant direct impact 
likely up to 2015 is a small increase in tree planting.  While trees have 
excellent potential to sequester carbon, the incentives for tree planting will be 
relatively small, given the limited scope of Australia’ proposed emissions 
reductions and the ability to import carbon credits from international markets.  
NRM managers should continue to manage carbon as one of a suite of issues 
without expecting rivers of gold to flow from carbon markets.  Some may 
choose to participate directly in carbon markets, although this is inherently 
risky given their ill-defined and rapidly evolving nature.  There is a need to 
develop improved understanding of carbon stocks and flows in the landscape, 
at both national and local scales. New institutions will be needed to secure 
carbon opportunities from agriculture and land management while also 
recognising other social and environmental objectives.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Widespread concern over the negative impacts of global warming means significant 
efforts are being made to manage levels of greenhouse gases (GHG) in the Earth’s 
atmosphere.  Carbon dioxide is the major contributor to anthropogenic warming, 
hence managing the carbon cycle has become a major issue.  Carbon is present in 
large quantities in vegetation and soil.  The management of these natural resources 
therefore has significant impacts on net greenhouse gas emissions.  In turn, carbon 
markets can have significant impacts on natural resource management (NRM).   
These impacts vary greatly between markets, depending on how carbon is 
accounted for, and what sectors and activities are covered by the markets in 
question.  
Carbon markets potentially offer opportunities for landholders and NRM 
agencies to generate revenues through mitigation and sequestration activities 
(although it should be noted that it may also involve liabilities for future emissions).  
Carbon sequestration can have positive environmental externalities (economic side 
effects) such as preservation and regeneration of native vegetation and sustainable 
soil management.  It can also be associated with negative externalities, for example 
monoculture pine plantations, reduced downstream water flows, pre-emptive clearing 
of vegetation, intensification of agriculture to produce biofuels, etc.  By offering 
landholders an additional source of income it may also make them less willing to 
engage in NRM on their land. 
Carbon markets currently permeate many discussions and debates.  Over 
recent years environmental issues, with global warming as a focus, have become a 
central, rather than peripheral, political issue.  Carbon management has been seized 
upon by many involved in NRM, in the hope that a long history of limited funding and 
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declines in natural resources may be reversed.  Carbon markets offer the potential to 
channel significant amounts of private funding to NRM, which up to now has mostly 
relied on limited public funding.  This offers many opportunities, such as increased 
incentives for maintaining native vegetation, reforestation and soil management.   
There are also threats, such as the potential for a major expansion of commercial 
forestry with negative impacts on rural communities, water and biodiversity. 
Regardless of individual views on the relative importance of global warming 
compared to other issues facing society, carbon markets are a fact of life, and are 
likely to remain so for the foreseeable future.  Those charged with managing natural 
resources must therefore be prepared to deal with them.  Some conservation 
organisations have pro-actively engaged with carbon markets in order to pursue their 
broader aims (eg. Greening Australia selling carbon offsets), while others remain on 
the sidelines.  As more details of current and future carbon markets emerge, it is 
necessary to comprehensively review current and future opportunities and threats for 
NRM in Australia.  This will enable an NRM manager to make an informed decision 
as to how best to address carbon markets going forward.  
Much of the NRM in Australia is carried out by 57 agencies, each of which is 
responsible for a particular area of the country.  This paper considers carbon 
markets from the perspective of one of these agencies, using the Murray Catchment 
Management Authority (CMA), as a case study.  Murray CMA is responsible for an 
area of 35,000km
2 in southern New South Wales (NSW), stretching from the 
Australian Alps to the Murray floodplains.  It is a statutory authority, governed by a 
board which reports to the NSW Government.
2  This paper sets out to review key 
existing and proposed carbon markets (domestic and international, voluntary and 
                                                      
2  Governance arrangements differ slightly for NRM agencies across jurisdictions. 
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compliance) and analyse their likely impact on NRM in Australia.  It then considers 
how a regional NRM manager such as Murray CMA might best respond to the 
opportunities and threats therein.  
The following section provides a very brief introduction to the concept of 
markets as a tool of public policy. Subsequent sections describe key compliance, 
pre-compliance and voluntary markets, with a focus on their implications for NRM.  
The final section considers how NRM policy in Australia may adapt as carbon 
markets continue to evolve over the next few years. 
MARKETS AS A POLICY TOOL 
A well functioning market can efficiently allocate scarce resources among competing 
users.  Simply through the actions of self-interested traders, resources will be 
exchanged so they end up being held by those who can make best use of them.  
Markets also promote innovation, rewarding those who find new and better ways of 
doing things.  The ability of markets to efficiently allocate resources makes them a 
powerful tool for public policy.  Through a market mechanism, individual traders 
reveal their costs and values and allocate resources among themselves.  Efficient 
outcomes can be achieved without the need for omniscience on the part of a policy 
maker, or ongoing policy intervention.  Facilitating a market therefore offers an 
efficient, transparent and simple solution to a range of policy problems. 
All markets require some degree of regulation.  Property rights must be 
defined and enforced, and legally transferable between traders.  Information must be 
available for traders to make informed decisions.  There must be competition 
between traders, and a means for them to locate and interact with each other.   
Social impacts, and spill-overs into other areas, must be considered.  Subject to 
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these conditions, a market is generally best left to its own devices in order to reach 
the most efficient outcome.  Where markets are created specifically to meet a policy 
objective, ongoing monitoring will be required to ensure that the market is performing 
well and the objective is being met.  
The Role of Carbon Markets 
Addressing climate change requires global carbon dioxide (and other greenhouse 
gas) emissions to be capped.  With an enforceable cap in place, the right to emit 
carbon becomes a limited resource. The central question then becomes how to 
allocate this resource among nations, firms and individuals.  Initial ownership of 
these pollution rights is an issue of politics and distributive justice.  Regardless of 
their initial distribution, it would be a desirable outcome for these rights to be used as 
efficiently as possible. Hence the role for carbon markets, to efficiently distribute 
limited rights to carbon pollution. 
It should be remembered that carbon markets themselves are not the solution 
to global warming.  The only solution is to cap carbon and other greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions.  Carbon markets are simply a means of meeting that cap as cost 
effectively as possible.  The tighter the cap, the greater the role for markets in 
minimising the costs of meeting it.  Carbon markets can also promote and reward 
innovations which reduce net carbon emissions, creating incentives for ongoing 
technological advancements.  While no market is ever perfect, there are significant 
flaws in many current and proposed carbon markets which must be addressed if 
carbon trading is to facilitate, rather than impede, greenhouse gas mitigation. 
A Diversity of Carbon Markets  
Carbon markets operate at a range of scales, from international (eg. Kyoto) to local 
schemes (eg. NSW GGAS).  There are also voluntary markets, in which individuals 
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and firms trade reductions in emissions even though they are not bound by a formal 
cap.  Therefore the term ‘carbon markets’ actually covers a great diversity of 
markets, with varying degrees of overlap.  As a whole, carbon markets have been 
growing rapidly in recent years.  In 2007 approximately 3 billion tons of carbon 
dioxide (or CO2-equivalent
3), with a value of approximately US$64 billion, were 
traded internationally, up from 1.7 billion tons and US$31 billion in 2006 (Capoor and 
Ambrosi, 2008).  Voluntary markets made up approximately 65 million tons and 
US$300 million in 2007 (Hamilton et al., 2008), which is less than 1% of the total.  
COMPLIANCE MARKETS 
Statutory, or compliance, markets are used by entities (eg. firms, countries) to meet 
their obligations under a legally biding cap or pollution permit requirement.  This 
category includes most current and proposed emission trading schemes.  This 
section describes the key schemes of direct relevance to Australia.  These markets 
effectively turn GHG emission permits into a global commodity, traded in a similar 
fashion to other commodities such as coal and iron ore.  This means that similar 
price cycles can be expected – it should be noted that the price of carbon in most 
markets has fallen sharply in line with other commodities during the financial crisis of 
2008. 
Kyoto Protocol 
The Kyoto Protocol (part of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change) is a legally binding international treaty which sets caps on GHG emissions 
from industrialised countries.  The overall aim was to reduce emissions from 
                                                      
3  Permits in all markets are expressed as tons of CO2-equivalent.  In addition to CO2 they also 
include other greenhouse gases, notably methane and nitrous oxide.  Volumes of these other gases 
are converted to the volume of CO2 that would have the equivalent impact on global warming.  For 
example, methane is a potent GHG, with a warming effect 21 times greater than CO2.  One ton of 
methane therefore represents 21 tons of CO2-equivalent GHG. 
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industrialised (‘annex 1’) countries by 5.2% in 2008-2012, compared to 1990 levels.  
Each annex 1 country has a specific cap, ranging from 8% below 1990 levels for the 
European Union (EU) to 10% above for Iceland.  Australia has a cap of 8% above 
1990 levels.  The Kyoto Protocol runs to the end of 2012.  Negotiations over a follow-
up international agreement will be held at the United Nations Climate Change 
Conference in Copenhagen in December 2009.  This conference will be crucial in 
setting future targets for GHG reductions and in shaping carbon markets post-2012.  
The Kyoto Protocol allows for carbon trading as a ‘flexibility mechanism’ to 
assist individual countries to meet their caps.  If a country looks set to exceed its 
emissions target, it can buy credits from another country that expects to emit less 
than its target.  Each credit represents one ton of carbon dioxide-equivalent (CO2-e) 
emissions.  Japan, New Zealand and the EU are likely to be significant net buyers of 
credits up to 2012 (World Bank 2008).  This flexibility is particularly valuable given 
the long time frame of the agreement (it was negotiated in 1997, at which point 
countries could not be certain of their future economic and emissions growth).  It 
enables the global cap to be efficiently met by guiding investment towards low-cost 
emission-reduction opportunities. 
However these flexibility mechanisms can also give rise to problems, 
something that arises again and again in carbon markets.  As the Kyoto baseline 
was set in 1990 a number of countries were left with excessive allocations.  The ex-
Soviet states underwent significant reductions in industrial output, and associated 
emissions, during the 1990s which is not recognised in their Kyoto targets, hence 
many have substantial excesses of permits (Klepper and Peterson, 2005).  Through 
carbon markets, these notional decreases in emissions can be traded for real 
increases in emissions elsewhere.  While this does not prevent the Kyoto protocol 
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from meeting its overall target, it does nothing to reduce emissions beyond business-
as-usual levels. 
Kyoto Offsets 
In addition to trading allowances between countries, Kyoto also allows for the 
creation of credits from carbon offsets, primarily through the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM).
4  Offsets are created by specific projects which can be shown to 
reduce GHG emissions (or sequester carbon).  CDM projects are specifically 
targeted at developing countries (i.e. non-annex 1 signatories), and are intended to 
promote sustainable development alongside emissions reductions.  As an annex 1 
country Australia is therefore not eligible to host CDM projects.  The standards and 
protocols of the CDM are widely applied in the voluntary market, in which Australia 
can and does participate, so the CDM process does merit further consideration. 
Any CDM project requires approval from the host country’s Designated 
National Authority.  Countries are free to set their own requirements to ensure that 
projects fit with their development goals.  Project proponents must demonstrate that 
a project generates additional emissions reductions, i.e. reductions that would not 
have happened anyway.  For any carbon offset this is the most complex and 
controversial issue (see Kollmuss et al., 2008).  It is necessary to determine a 
baseline level of emissions that would have occurred in the absence of the project.  
Offsets can then be created for emissions reductions beyond this baseline.  In 
practice it is frequently very difficult to establish whether a particular project would 
have gone ahead without qualifying for the CDM, and to determine accurate 
baselines.  
                                                      
4  Joint Implementation (JI) projects are another source of Kyoto offsets.  These projects take place in 
annex 1 countries, and require an equivalent reduction in the host country’s cap, and so are more 
analogous to trading surplus allowances than creating new credits.  Australia has ruled out hosting JI 
projects until at least 2013 (White Paper ch.11, p.32). 
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Allowing offsets which are not genuinely additional into a market can prevent 
it from achieving its policy objective, that is reducing GHG emissions.  Every offset 
that is created and traded within the formal Kyoto market allows an equivalent 
increase in emissions elsewhere.  Therefore offsets without additionality result in a 
net increase in GHG emissions.  The CDM applies an ‘additionality tool’
5 to 
determine whether a project offers additional emissions reductions.  This includes 
determining whether the project would be viable without revenues from selling CDM, 
and whether it is standard practice or a regulatory requirement for the industry in 
question.  Baselines are established by applying one of a series of ‘approved 
methodologies’.  All CDM projects must be validated by a third party auditor – one of 
around 25 companies accredited by the CDM Executive Board.  Once a project is 
validated and registered, it can start creating offsets, termed Certified Emissions 
Reductions (CERs).  Ongoing performance must be verified by the auditor. 
The CDM dominates the carbon offset market, with 1,617 registered projects 
having created 298 million offsets, as of May 2009, with many more in the pipeline.  
By 2012 around 1.6 billion offsets are likely to have been created through the CDM.
6  
The majority of registered CDM projects involve renewable energy and energy 
efficiency (1,185).  There are 106 agriculture and just four afforestation and 
reforestation projects.  Under the CDM, forestry projects are considered to provide 
only temporary sequestration, given the limited lifespan of trees.  They are granted 
temporary credits, which are valid for between 5 and 60 years, after which they 
would have to be replaced by other credits.  The temporary nature of CDM offsets 
from forestry places such schemes at a competitive disadvantage compared to all 
                                                      
5  See http://cdmrulebook.org/pageid/86  
6  http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/index.html  
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other types of CDM projects, and as a result forests play a negligible role in the 
CDM.  It also limits forestry projects in other markets which apply CDM standards.  
As with many early carbon markets, the CDM was intended as a learning 
process.  Nonetheless, there have been many criticisms of the CDM, and many 
mistakes from which to learn.  Unsurprisingly additionality has been a key concern.  
Schneider (2007) estimates that it is unlikely or questionable for roughly 40% of 
registered projects, which generate about 20% of the total offsets.  There are 
concerns over conflicts of interest with the independent auditors, who oversee 
validation and verification.  These auditors are commercial companies hired by the 
project proponent.  They operate in a very competitive market, and may be more 
concerned with satisfying the client and getting the job done quickly than in applying 
the most rigorous standards (Kollmuss et al., 2008).  The CDM Executive Board is 
continually updating standards and processes.  The proportion of projects reviewed 
by the Board has been increasing in recent years, as has the proportion of rejections 
(Schneider, 2007).  In late 2008 one of the major auditing companies (Det Norske 
Veritas) was temporarily suspended from the CDM process due to concerns over its 
verification procedures.  It is to be hoped that these actions will succeed in raising 
the standards of CDM projects.  
Kyoto and NRM 
The Kyoto Protocol requires countries to develop inventories of national greenhouse 
gas emissions covering sources and sinks in six sectors: energy; industrial 
processes; solvent and other product use; agriculture; land use, land use change 
and forestry (LULUCF); and waste.  Agricultural sources include: prescribed burning 
of savannas; enteric fermentation from livestock; manure management; methane 
from rice cultivation; nitrous oxides from agricultural fertiliser use; and burning of 
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agricultural residues.  Agriculture contributes 16% of Australia’s net emissions, which 
is a relatively high proportion (DCC, 2008a).  While agriculture is not directly 
impacted by the proposed emissions trading scheme, it inevitably will be more 
directly involved in future schemes, particularly the livestock sector.  
LULUCF covers emissions and removals of greenhouse gases resulting from 
direct human-induced land use, land-use change and forestry activities.  For 
Australia this includes reforestation and land clearing.  A forest is defined as an area 
of at least 0.2 hectares with trees to a height of at least 2m and crown cover of at 
least 20%.  Reforestation (or afforestation) covers human-induced establishment of 
forests on land that was clear of forest on January 1, 1990.  Australia’s carbon 
accounts include net emissions from forests (reforestation – deforestation), including 
carbon both in trees and in the forest soil.  Article 3.4 of the Kyoto Protocol covers 
carbon stored in agricultural crops and soils, carbon stored in grazing lands and 
revegetation that does not meet forest criteria.  This article is optional, and Australia 
has chosen not to account for these activities until at least 2012.  This means that in 
Australia only biological carbon in forests is counted towards Kyoto compliance.   
There are likely to be substantial changes to coverage and accounting rules in any 
successor to the Kyoto Protocol (from 2013 onwards). 
It should be noted that the baselines for Kyoto are based on net emissions in 
1990, when Australia’s rate of land clearing was estimated to be very high.   
Subsequent reductions in land clearing have made a very substantial contribution 
towards meeting Australia’s Kyoto target.  Between 1990 and 2006 LULUCF 
emissions declined from 99.7Mt to 13.8Mt (DCC, 2008a).  While this is not privately 
traded in carbon markets, it is of great value at the national level.  Without it, 
Australia would be set to exceed its Kyoto target by around 80Mt per annum, 
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representing a very substantial liability, requiring either the purchase of billions of 
dollars worth of international credits by the Federal Government or costly reductions 
in other sectors. 
The Kyoto CDM offset mechanism does not address NRM issues other than 
GHG emissions reductions.  It was intended to promote sustainable development, 
and host countries are free to select projects which meet their social objectives.  In 
practice it does not appear to have successfully combined development and 
emissions reductions (Schneider, 2007; Sirohi, 2007).  In part this is because host 
countries are unlikely to reject any project with even very small benefits, as 
effectively there is competition between countries to host CDM projects.  There is 
often a trade-off between additionality and sustainable development benefits 
(Schneider, 2007).  This experience suggests there may be challenges in any 
scheme to combine emissions reductions with other benefits (eg. NRM) in Australia. 
A recent Kyoto spin-off initiative is Reducing Emissions from Deforestation 
and Forest Degradation (REDD).  The clearing of tropical forests contributes around 
20% of global GHG emissions annually.  REDD, which is administered by the UN, 
aims to address this by providing funding to developing countries to protect their 
existing forests.  Only developing countries are eligible for REDD, so it does not 
apply directly to Australia.  Offsets from REDD are not currently formally recognised 
in Kyoto markets, although they may be in future commitment periods.  Some 
speculators are attempting to secure credits with this in mind.  
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
The European Union (EU) Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) represents the EU’s 
response to the Kyoto Protocol.  Through the ETS, national Kyoto targets are 
devolved to industry.  Member states have national targets, and each allocates 
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permits (known as European Union Allowances) to their relevant industries.  The 
ETS covers energy and industrial sectors, encompassing over 10,000 emissions 
sources.  Trading in the EU ETS is done by firms.  Each firm must ensure it has 
sufficient permits to cover its emissions each year.  The first trading period ran from 
2005-2007, before Kyoto targets came into force.  The second trading period covers 
the Kyoto commitment period of 2008-2012.  
The EU ETS is by far the biggest carbon market.  In 2007 over $50 billion 
worth of EU permits were traded (Capoor and Ambrosi, 2008).  CDM offsets can be 
used within the EU ETS, although this is subject to limits – for example, in the UK no 
more than 8% of a firm’s permits can come from the CDM.  However, given the size 
and scope of the EU ETS, European firms are likely to be significant buyers of CDM 
offsets.  CDM forestry projects are excluded from the EU ETS since they are 
considered as temporary credits only, unlike other CDM projects.  
New South Wales Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme 
The New South Wales (NSW) Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme (GGAS), which 
commenced in January 2003, is one of the world’s earliest carbon trading schemes.  
While being a pioneering example of an emissions trading scheme, it has also 
clearly demonstrated many of the potential problems and pitfalls of carbon markets.  
The aim was to reduce per capita greenhouse gas emissions from electricity 
consumed in NSW.  The liable entities in the scheme were retailers (and some large 
industrial electricity users), who had to surrender GGAS abatement certificates 
(known as NGACs) based on their share of total electricity supply.  The burden did 
not fall directly on electricity generators.  
The majority of abatement certificates created during the early years of the 
scheme were from existing power plants and those commissioned prior to the start of 
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the scheme (Passey et al., 2008).  Additionality is therefore likely to have been 
extremely low, given that these facilities were not directly influenced by the scheme.  
Comparison to average historical emissions in the sector meant that even brown 
coal fired power stations were able to create abatement certificates.  In addition to 
emissions reductions attributed to electricity production, certificates could also be 
created through sequestration and demand abatement.  Forestry projects on land 
clear of trees in 1990 can be eligible for abatement certificates, with the provision 
that carbon stocks are maintained for 100 years.  The proportion of certificates 
derived from sequestration remained low, averaging around 3% of the total (IPART 
2008).  
The market price of GGAS certificates never exceeded A$15, below the costs 
of most commercial forestry schemes (Stavins and Richards, 2005).  Prices have 
since crashed in the market, in part due to an oversupply of offsets as commercial 
operators took advantage of loopholes in the scheme rules to create large numbers 
of cheap permits (Crossley, 2008).  It has also become clear that permits will not be 
accepted in the forthcoming national scheme, which will supersede the NSW 
version.  While GGAS certificates have limited value in the compliance market, they 
are being sold by some offset providers in the voluntary markets (at prices many 
times higher than recent trades in the compliance market).
7  
Australian Mandatory Renewable Energy Target 
The Mandatory Renewable Energy Target (MRET) is a Federal Government scheme 
which requires electricity suppliers to source a certain proportion of their electricity 
from renewable sources.  Generators of renewable energy create Renewable 
Energy Certificates.  These can be traded, allowing suppliers who fall below the 
                                                      
7  See http://www.carbonoffsetguide.com.au/providers  
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renewable energy target to purchase credits from those who exceed it.  While not a 
carbon market per se, it is worth briefly considering as it interacts with other 
schemes.  MRET began in 2001 with a very low (0.24%) renewable energy target.  
This has increased gradually, and in 2009 is 3.64%.  The Government has 
announced it intends to raise the target to 20% by 2020.  This is likely to have a far 
greater impact than the proposed national ETS on renewable energy generation.  
For regional areas this is likely to translate to an ongoing increase in demand for 
sites for wind turbines. 
There has been considerable overlap between MRET and the NSW GGAS 
scheme, resulting in activities being double-counted (MacGill et al., 2006).  Another 
aspect of MRET worth noting is that renewable energy includes generators burning 
biomass, including ‘waste from harvesting native forests’.  This clearly has 
interesting implications for NRM, and the controversy has affected the market, with 
certificates from these sources fetching lower prices than other certificates (MacGill 
et al., 2006).  Renewable energy projects make up a significant share of the global 
carbon offset market, and it is likely that similar issues will arise with other schemes.  
Australia’s Proposed Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) 
The Australian Government has announced it will initiate a national emissions 
trading scheme, termed the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS), in mid-
2011.  This will be a cap-and-trade scheme, covering around 1,000 major polluters in 
the energy, transport, industrial and waste sectors.  The indicative targets are for a 
5-25% reduction compared to 2000 levels by 2020.  The CPRS will permit unlimited 
imports of certain classes of permits
8 from international Kyoto compliance markets, 
but will not allow CPRS permits to be exported (White Paper, ch.11).  There is an 
                                                      
8  CDM offsets (CERs), JI offsets (ERUs) and EU permits (EUAs). 
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initial price cap for the CPRS of A$10 per permit in the first year of the scheme, 
rising to $40 subsequently
9 (White Paper, ch.8, p.37).  The ability to import permits 
means that prices will be determined by international markets – CDM offsets are 
trading at around A$16 as of May 2009.  
Reforestation is included in the CPRS on a voluntary basis.  This means that, 
unlike other covered sectors, forest owners can choose whether to opt-in to the 
scheme.  Permits will be granted based on average sequestration projections, rather 
than monitoring actual sequestration.  This will include a buffer to account for the 
probability of loss to fire, pests, disease or severe drought.  This reduces the risk to 
forest owners; if trees are lost, permits do not have to be surrendered providing the 
trees are allowed to regenerate.  However, it also reduces the incentive for forest 
owners to manage these risks.  If a registered forest is subsequently cleared, the 
owner will be liable to surrender permits.  This does create a potential liability, as 
future carbon prices may be higher.  Both landowners and other ‘eligible forest 
entities’ who hold rights over carbon in forestry (which could include leaseholders 
and NRM agencies) can participate directly in the CPRS.  This is to be tightly 
regulated, to ensure that any future liabilities (i.e. from loss of trees) are met.  
Established forests can be registered, although they will only receive permits 
once carbon stocks are greater than in 2008, meaning there is no incentive to clear 
and re-plant.  This appears to limit the potential for the retrospective crediting back to 
initial establishment which occurs in some voluntary markets.  “Permits will not be 
issued for greenhouse gas removals that have been sold as offsets, as this would 
result in double-counting of abatement” (White Paper, ch.6, p.56), although it is not 
clear how this will be enforced.  Unlike forestry established under the CDM and 
                                                      
9  The price will be capped at $40 in 2012, rising by 5% per year to 2015. 
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many of the voluntary carbon standards, there is no test of additionality under the 
CPRS.  This will result in offsets being created from business-as-usual activities, 
which can be used to cancel out increased emissions from other sectors.  
Reforestation is based on the Kyoto rules, and so can only be counted on 
land clear of forest in 1990.  This means there is no basis for clearing remnant native 
forests for plantations, although regrowth forest and non-forest native vegetation 
areas could be replaced.  There is potential for ‘leakage’, when the establishment of 
carbon offsets simply shifts emissions elsewhere.  In the case of forestry, plantation 
trees may be retained for their carbon value while harvesting shifts to native forests, 
the clearing of which does not incur a liability to the land owner under the CPRS 
(though it does incur a liability to the Australian Government under the Kyoto 
Protocol).  In states where native vegetation is protected by law this should not be an 
issue. 
The CPRS White Paper notes that forestry does raise concerns of conversion 
of land and impacts on water availability.  It explicitly states that the CPRS will not 
take account of other NRM implications, on the grounds that they are better dealt 
with under existing frameworks (White Paper, ch.6, p.49).  Deforestation is not 
included, which means that landholders who do not register their forests incur no 
liability under the CPRS if the forest is cleared or harvested.  Agriculture and other 
land-use change activities are excluded from the CPRS until at least 2015 (with a 
decision due in 2013 about future involvement).  
The only direct impact of the CPRS on land management will be to increase 
the financial benefits from establishing forestry.  Carbon benefits are to be calculated 
using the National Carbon Accounting Toolbox (NCAT).  Alternative tree species (eg. 
natives vs non-natives) have different carbon yield curves as modelled using NCAT, 
16 A. Reeson 
and hence would have different values of the reforestation project.  Given the costs 
of establishing and maintaining trees there is unlikely to be a major increase in 
forestry activity – the ability to import permits means Australian landholders are 
effectively competing with overseas offset providers.  This competition is one-
directional as offsets generated in Australia under the CPRS cannot be exported. 
The CPRS potentially offers an additional source of income to landholders 
undertaking revegetation work.  This does come with a future liability should they 
choose to clear the land.  Engaging with the CPRS will require accreditation as 
‘accredited forest entity’, which will be a complex process with initial registration and 
verification and ongoing annual reporting.  It is more likely that landholders will sell 
their carbon to specialist brokers who are accredited in the CPRS.  
The CPRS and Voluntary Carbon Markets  
The introduction of the CPRS has considerable implications for voluntary markets.  
Some voluntary activity will be superseded by the CPRS, and some may be crowded 
out, as people are less likely to act voluntarily in the presence of formal regulations 
and markets (see Frey, 1997; Reeson, 2008).  Any voluntary scheme will need to be 
clearly delineated from a compliance scheme.  For example, while Medicare 
provides a wide range of health benefits, no one is likely to voluntarily donate money 
to it.  However, many people do choose to support other non-profit medical 
organisations which are clearly distinct from the government-run system.  Exactly the 
same is likely to apply to carbon markets, so expecting voluntary activity to be 
incorporated within the CPRS is unrealistic.  
Currently voluntary markets in Australia are unregulated, other than within the 
broad scope of the Trades Practices Act which protects consumers from misleading 
or deceptive conduct.  In parallel with the introduction of the CPRS, the Australian 
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Government has announced an intention to more closely regulate voluntary carbon 
offset providers.  The National Carbon Offset Standard Discussion Paper (DCC, 
2008b) sets out some options for doing this.  It proposes one option for voluntary 
actions is the voluntary surrender of CPRS permits.  If permits in the CPRS turn out 
to be over-allocated (as they were in the EU ETS) this will also impact on the 
voluntary markets.  Given most permits are likely to be given to polluters, it is unlikely 
that many people will wish to buy them back from the polluters in order to voluntarily 
surrender them.  
The Discussion Paper also suggests that, as in the CPRS, some Kyoto-
compliant permits and CDM offsets (although not temporary offsets from forestry) 
should be recognised as legitimate offsets.  The rules governing these forms of 
carbon credit mean they cannot be generated within Australia.  The Discussion 
Paper is open to which, if any, of the international voluntary carbon standards (see 
below) may be recognised within a national standard.  The UK Government has 
recently introduced a similar national accreditation scheme which recognises only 
formal Kyoto offsets and EU permits; given none of these can be generated in 
Australia, adopting this approach would curtail the domestic offset industry.  
It also considers whether any voluntary domestic offsets from sources not 
covered by the CPRS (eg. agriculture) should contribute to Australia’s Kyoto 
obligations.  If they are counted by the Government towards the national obligation 
then there would be no additionality from these voluntary offsets as they would 
simply reduce the need for emission reductions elsewhere.  Given the CPRS will set 
caps five years in advance, there appears to be little opportunity to adjust that cap to 
account for current voluntary activity.  The best potential for offsets may be in areas 
not picked up in Australia’s carbon accounts, such as non-forest soil carbon, non-
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forest native vegetation, grazing management and feral animals.  However, the 
scope of the national accounts may extend to include these sectors in the next few 
years.  
The Discussion Paper also asks whether, with a cap in place under the 
CPRS, all firms covered by it may consider themselves carbon neutral, since any 
changes in their emissions should be cancelled out elsewhere in the CPRS.  This is 
not a credible definition of carbon neutral.  While the pitfalls raised in the Discussion 
Paper can hopefully be avoided in the resultant national offset standard, in the 
meantime the voluntary carbon markets in Australia are shrouded by uncertainty.  A 
national standard may or may not be mandatory (the UK version is not), and may or 
may not rule out some or all sources of domestic offsets (the UK version does).  
PRE-COMPLIANCE MARKETS 
While the EU moved early to impose a cap on carbon emissions, backed by an 
emissions trading scheme, there has yet to be an equivalent initiative in North 
America.  In the absence of a statutory scheme, a number of formal voluntary 
schemes have arisen.  These are used by companies to show they are addressing 
carbon emissions.  They are also considered as ‘pre-compliance’ markets, serving 
as a training ground for firms that will be impacted by future compliance markets.  
Some participants also trade in the hope or expectation that credits obtained in these 
pre-compliance markets can be used in future compliance markets (although there is 
no guarantee of this).  
Chicago Climate Exchange 
Membership of the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) is voluntary, but those firms 
which choose to join are then legally bound by emissions caps.  There are 350 
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members to date, who must reduce their overall emissions by 6% by 2010.  Like 
Kyoto and the EU ETS, this target is supported by tradeable permits.  Firms can 
trade permits with each other, and they can also purchase offsets from accredited 
offset providers.  The CCX provides a series of carbon standards to underpin these 
offsets.  These standards cover a broad range of activities, including renewable 
energy, agricultural methane, agricultural soil carbon, rangelands soil carbon and 
forestry carbon. This is the broadest set of standards available for NRM activities.  
Each CCX standard includes baseline setting and monitoring methodologies.  
Projects must demonstrate that they are not covered by existing regulations (for 
example, not in sectors already covered by a national emissions cap) and that they 
are not simply standard industry practice.  Offsets can then be traded on the CCX, 
although prices tend to be low (US$1.30 in May 2009) as it only includes companies 
that have voluntarily signed up (which are likely to be ones with low abatement 
costs).  Retrospective crediting is allowed, dating back to actions in 2003 (or 2006 for 
some project types).  
To date around 65 million offsets have been issued through the CCX; 20 
million of these are based on agricultural soil carbon, one million on agricultural 
methane and nine million on forestry.
10  Offsets can be sourced internationally, so 
the CCX does provide an option for registering offsets from a range of activities up to 
2010.  Beyond that the future is uncertain, and Australian schemes may not qualify 
once the CPRS is established (offsets from the EU cannot be registered to avoid 
double counting with the EU ETS).  The registration process appears relatively 
straightforward (at least compared to other schemes).  However, given the low price 
of CCX offsets, it may still not be an attractive option.  
                                                      
10  http://theccx.com/docs/offsets/Reports/CCX_Offsets_Report_V1No2_Feb09.pdf  
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California Climate Action Registry 
The California Climate Action Registry (CCAR) is a voluntary scheme originally 
established by the California State Government which in intended “to protect and 
promote early actions to reduce GHG emissions by organizations”.  It provides clear 
standards for measuring, monitoring and reporting emissions, as well as for offsets. 
They provide rigorous standards for the provision of offsets, which include forestry 
and livestock management. However they are currently only applicable in the US. 
VOLUNTARY MARKET STANDARDS 
Like most countries, voluntary carbon markets in Australia are, as yet, entirely 
unregulated.  There are a great range of voluntary offset providers in the market.  Up 
to now it has been the case that pretty much anything goes, and this is reflected in 
the variable quality of voluntary offsets currently in the market.  To sell carbon in the 
voluntary markets as they exist at the moment, the key requirement is to find a 
buyer.  If you have someone willing to buy, you can sell almost anything.  The only 
formal limitations are fraud and misleading advertising provisions, which given the 
uncertainties surrounding carbon would not be straightforward to apply.  
Some voluntary offset providers use credits from formal markets such as 
CDMs, NSW GGAS or Renewable Energy Certificates.  While this does ensure that 
clear standards are used, it does not necessarily guarantee additionality given the 
flaws inherent in some of these schemes.  A number of standards have been 
developed specifically for voluntary markets in an attempt to provide credibility and 
help purchasers make informed decisions.  The following sections describe the 
major standards and their relevance to NRM in Australia.  It should be noted that 
carbon offset markets are at a relatively early stage in their development.  
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New standards are emerging all the time.  It is likely that many will disappear 
as a small number come to dominate the market.  As discussed above in relation to 
Australia’s proposed CPRS, the increasing scope of formal compliance markets 
worldwide will impact on voluntary markets.  It is unlikely they will continue growing 
as rapidly as in recent years, and they may even disappear entirely.  However, in the 
short term voluntary markets can contribute to GHG mitigation, and they offer 
opportunities for innovation and learning by doing.  Voluntary markets could 
therefore be used to pave the way into future compliance markets for ‘difficult’ 
sectors such as agriculture and land management.  
Greenhouse Friendly 
Greenhouse Friendly is an Australian standard, developed and administered by the 
Federal Government through the Australian Greenhouse Office (now Department of 
Climate Change).  It provides accreditation for offset providers and offset projects 
located within Australia.  This standard is widely used in the voluntary sector.   
However, the scheme is currently on hold, with no new applications being accepted.  
Greenhouse Friendly applies to a very broad range of offset projects.  Accreditation 
is based on self assessment and independent verification.  Forestry offset standards 
are included in Greenhouse Friendly, which are based on Kyoto/CDM accounting 
and monitoring standards, applying the National Carbon Accounting Toolbox.   
Secure ownership of sequestered carbon is required, and a commitment to maintain 
trees for at least 70 years.  Additionality is required for Greenhouse Friendly 
accreditation, which limits the potential for retrospective forestry credits. 
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VER+ 
VER+ is an international voluntary carbon standard, based on the CDM.
11  It covers 
projects that are not eligible under CDM, for example because they are not located in 
a developing country, or are not formally approved by the host country for the CDM.  
VER+ was established by one of the companies involved in validating CDM projects 
(TÜV SÜD), who do most of the auditing themselves.  It claims to be faster and more 
flexible than the CDM (which is eminently believable!).  It therefore covers a broad 
range of projects and locations.  As with the CDM-proper, forestry has a limited role, 
and there is no place for other land management activities.  
Gold Standard 
The Gold Standard for voluntary carbon credits was developed by the World Wide 
Fund for Nature (WWF).  It requires social and environmental benefits, in addition to 
carbon, and can be applied to both CDM offsets for compliance markets and 
voluntary offsets.  Despite the involvement of WWF, it does not consider 
reforestation and other land management activities, being focussed solely on 
renewable energy and energy efficiency projects (although it is stated that there are 
options to develop new methodologies within this standard).  In countries with a 
formal cap it will only operate if national permits are retired, so it may not be 
applicable to Australia.  
The Gold Standard applies the CDM additionality tool and baseline/monitoring 
methodologies.  It allows up to two years retrospective crediting (to be phased out by 
the end of 2009).  It uses the same companies as the CDM for validation and 
                                                      
11  Offsets in voluntary markets are often termed Voluntary Emissions Reductions (VERs).  This is 
intended to parallel the Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs) created through the CDM.  However 
there is no formal definition of a VER, and no common standard, so it can be applied to anything in 
the voluntary market.  VER+ represents a standard with a formal definition, intended to be a 
guarantee of quality. 
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verification, but requires a different one for each stage.  To date there are just 16 
registered voluntary projects which have created around one million offsets, with 
another 80 projects in the pipeline.
12  There are also 6 registered Gold Standard 
CDM projects which have created eighty thousand offsets, with another 96 projects 
in the pipeline. 
Voluntary Carbon Standard 
The Voluntary Carbon Standard (VCS) is operated by a Swiss-based non-profit 
organisation.  It is the broadest of the major standards, covering most project types 
in any location.  It is also the most widely used, with the largest number of voluntary 
offsets in the market.  However, a registry is still under development.  The VCS 
accepts CDM baseline/monitoring methodologies, and also has many of its own.  All 
projects are assessed by independent auditors.  Offset providers do have the option 
to develop methodologies for new projects, subject to verification by two independent 
auditors.  The VCS requires additionality, applying a test similar to that used in the 
CDM.  Up to two years retrospective crediting is allowed. 
Land management activities covered in the VCS include: 
•  Afforestation, Reforestation and Revegetation  
•  Agricultural Land Management  
•  Improved Forest Management  
•  Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD). 
There are also methodologies under development to extend these further, which will 
apparently include reduced emissions from fire management. VCS does not explicitly 
rate environmental co-benefits.  
                                                      
12  http://goldstandard.apx.com/resources/AccessReports.asp  
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VCS sequestration offsets are considered permanent, unlike the CDM.  To 
account for possible losses it incorporates a buffer, which varies from 5-60% 
depending on the level of risk inherent in a project.  This buffer is reduced over time, 
subject to satisfactory verifications.  VCS is the first, and so far only, standard to 
cover all the major land management activities.  While it is a flexible standard 
covering a broad range of activities, it also rigorously considers additionality and 
permanence issues.  It has excellent potential to be applied to NRM activities in 
Australia. 
Offset Providers 
The Australian Carbon Offset Guide, an independent resource provided by the 
Victorian EPA, identifies 68 voluntary offset providers active in Australia.  A number 
of these are selling ‘non-accredited’ offsets, for which no independent standards 
exist.  Forestry is a popular source of offsets in voluntary markets.  Many offset 
providers use 1990 land cover as the baseline for offset projects, and so issue 
offsets retrospectively for tree planting that has occurred at any time since 1990. 
However, it is likely that most offset buyers imagine their purchase is providing 
additional carbon sequestration, rather than rewarding landholders for past actions.  
Many Australian offset providers source some or all of their offsets from 
overseas.  This is not surprising given that most independent standards do not cover 
projects in Australia.  With the suspension of the Greenhouse Friendly program, 
there are limited options for offset providers to register projects in Australia.   
However, many of the offsets on sale would not meet the standards required for 
registration due to weak additionality.  
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NRM Standards 
The VCS recognises carbon from a range of activities, but does not have any 
additional environmental requirements.  NRM benefits can be recognised in other 
ways.  One example is the Climate Community and Biodiversity Standards (CCBS), 
which can be combined with other full offset standards.  CCBS focuses exclusively 
on land-based bio-sequestration and mitigation projects, requiring climate, 
community and biodiversity benefits.  On its own, CCBS accreditation may not be 
adequate for a credible offset program as it does not have specific methods for 
verifying emissions reductions.  It does use independent auditors to verify projects.  
It should be noted that most international standards, with the exception of VCS, are 
generally not supportive of forestry and other land management activities.   
Combining VCS and CCBS accreditation may offer a way to generate credible high 
quality offsets which combine GHG with biodiversity and community benefits.  
Bilateral Voluntary Markets 
Much of the current voluntary activity is not traded in public markets, but simply 
occurs through bilateral deals.  If an offset provider can find a buyer, especially a 
large corporate, it does not necessarily need to seek registration and accreditation 
for the carbon it is providing (although many buyers may prefer that it does).  An 
example of a bilateral deal is the West Arnhem Land Fire Abatement (WALFA) 
project in the Northern Territory.  WALFA is supported by a gas producer 
(ConocoPhillips) and the Northern Territory Government.  The agreement to 
purchase emissions abatement from WALFA was put in place as part of the 
approvals process for a new gas facility.  Other firms have made similar deals for 
goodwill or corporate social responsibility reasons.  
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CARBON MARKETS AND NRM IN AUSTRALIA 
Much is assumed about the impact of carbon markets on NRM.  However, from this 
review, it appears that in the short and medium term the impact in Australia will be 
minor.  The vast majority of land management activities fall outside the scope of both 
the CPRS and most voluntary market standards (and in the case of the CPRS will 
remain so until at least 2015).  Carbon markets do, and will continue to, provide 
increased incentives for forestry.  However these incentives are relatively small, and 
so would not be expected to lead to a massive increase in forestry projects.   
Landholders may, however, be less willing to engage in ongoing NRM activities such 
as revegetation in the belief that they will be able to secure a better return from 
future carbon markets.  
While the CPRS will place only a limited value on a limited range of NRM 
activities, it should be remembered that the CPRS represents only a subset of 
Australia’s engagement in international climate change mitigation efforts.  The CPRS 
will cover only around 75% of Australia’s accountable emissions.  The remaining 
25%, which includes emissions from agriculture, land clearing and prescribed 
burning, must be managed directly by the Government in order to meet its 
obligations under the Kyoto Protocol (and its successor, if any).  If emissions 
increase the Government may need to purchase Kyoto permits from other countries.  
Similarly if net emissions decrease the Government may have excess permits to sell.  
Regardless of the CPRS, emissions from agriculture and other land management 
activities are valued under international agreements, and it is in the national interest 
to promote activities which reduce net GHG emissions. 
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Opportunities in Voluntary Markets 
These are interesting times for voluntary carbon markets.  Up to now, these markets 
have had something of the Wild West about them, with no regulation, considerable 
uncertainty and a rapid growth of innovative offset schemes.  The quality of offsets 
on sale varies from good to useless.  However, things are changing fast in the 
voluntary offset market.  The UK Government has moved to introduce a formal 
standard.  While this will not be mandatory, it is likely that most offset providers will 
feel the need to apply it, as credibility is all important.  The UK standards are 
restricted to Kyoto recognised credits, which rules out any Australia generated 
offsets.  The Australian Government is considering a similar national standard, for 
which the details remain far from clear.  
Some conservation groups and NRM agencies have set themselves up as 
providers of carbon offsets.
13  These services are aimed at individuals and 
households who wish to voluntarily offset their emissions, sold direct to the public 
through websites.  With expertise in vegetation management and extensive networks 
with landholders, NRM agencies are well placed to take on such a role, with the 
potential to raise revenues which can be used to support their broader activities.  
Murray CMA has not yet gone down this path.  Given the uncertainty surrounding 
voluntary markets in Australia with the impending introduction of an as yet undefined 
national standard, this would not appear to be a good time to be investing in a 
carbon offset business.  At the same time, the introduction of the CPRS and similar 
initiatives internationally is likely to crowd out much voluntary activity. 
There should also be significant concerns over the quality of many offsets 
sold in the voluntary market.  Many are based on actions such as tree planting which 
                                                      
13  See www.breatheeasynow.com.au/html/ and www.degreecelsius.com.au/  
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occurred some years ago and so offer no additionality.  They may have the 
unintended consequence of actually increasing in emissions through assuaging 
individuals’ consciences without making any real contribution to GHG mitigation (see 
Spash and Reeson).  An unusual feature of carbon markets is that buyers never 
actually consume the carbon, so they cannot directly judge the quality.  In 
competitive offset markets, it is difficult to distinguish high quality (i.e. genuinely 
additional) carbon from low quality.  An offset provider will always face a conflict 
between maximising sales through low quality offsets versus maintaining high 
standards. 
Given these uncertainties and concerns, and the already crowded voluntary 
offset market, entering the voluntary markets does not appear to represent an 
attractive opportunity to an NRM agency such as Murray CMA.  Carbon trading 
entails significant financial and reputational risks.  A watching brief should be 
maintained as the market is evolving rapidly and there may be more opportunities in 
the future.  In the meantime, they may better serve their community by acting as a 
source of genuinely impartial advice about the advantages and disadvantages of 
participating in the voluntary markets.  
Opportunities in the CPRS  
As discussed above, the only direct impact of the CPRS on regional NRM is through 
the provision of offsets from reforestation.  This is most likely to occur on marginal 
agricultural land, rather than on a broad scale across the catchment.  Under the 
structure of the proposed CPRS, there is potential for NRM agencies and others to 
participate directly in trading forestry offsets through registering as an ‘eligible forest 
entity’.  Such an entity would need to secure carbon rights from landowners in order 
to create offsets.  Establishing the capacity to serve as a broker will be complex and 
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resource intensive.  The opportunities for offset providers are likely to be small, given 
the modest initial emissions reductions in the CPRS.  There is likely to be 
considerable competition from existing brokers already active in voluntary markets.  
Offset providers in the CPRS will also be competing with international CDM 
providers, since the CPRS allows unlimited import of CDM offsets. 
In the event that the United Nations Climate Change Conference in 
Copenhagen at the end of 2009 agrees to major global reductions in emissions, the 
carbon price, and hence the incentive for forestry and (eventually) other 
sequestration activities, is likely to be significantly higher in the future.  However, as 
with the CPRS and other existing carbon markets, the on-ground implications will 
depend on the details.  Which activities are covered, how they are defined and 
measured, how baselines are determined and how credits can be traded will depend 
on the outcomes of the international negotiations.  Until such details become clear, 
investments in GHG mitigation and sequestration are financially (though not 
environmentally) speculative as future returns are highly uncertain. 
The opportunities for direct involvement by a regional NRM agency such as 
Murray CMA in the CPRS appear limited at this stage.  A better option may be to 
remain an informed observer, capable of offering impartial information to the local 
community.  With high agricultural productivity and relatively low (and declining) 
rainfall, much of southern Australia, including the Murray-Darling Basin, is perhaps 
less than ideal for commercial tree growing.  There may also be bushfire risks to 
consider.  Growing trees use large amounts of water.  Establishing forests towards 
the top of water catchments can significantly reduce the amount of water available to 
downstream users.  In some jurisdictions landowners are able to plant trees without 
securing water rights (as they are not directly pumping from a river).  This is an 
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ongoing problem which may get worse given the increased incentives for forestry 
provided by the CPRS.  
NRM agencies should therefore seek to change planning guidelines to ensure 
that new commercial forestry projects do not adversely affect downstream water 
users.  Forestry may need to be regulated in important sources of fresh water for the 
catchment.  It may be promoted in more saline areas in order to reduce downstream 
salinity.  NRM planners should also pro-actively consider issues around the location 
of wind turbines.  The Federal Government has proposed a significant expansion of 
renewable energy generation, of which wind turbines currently offer the most efficient 
technology.  Potential impacts such as landscape aesthetics and impacts on 
migratory birds should be considered and managed where necessary.  
Revegetation work undertaken by NRM agencies is likely to be eligible as 
carbon offsets under the CPRS (provided it meets the definition of reforestation, and 
the land was clear of tree in 1990).  Such revegetation typically takes place on 
private land, with the NRM agency contracting the landholder to undertake the work.  
Some agencies are including a provision in their contracts to retain ownership of 
carbon in the trees.  Establishing rights over carbon will require a new form of 
contract which will be untested in the courts.  Until more details of the CPRS come to 
light an agency cannot be certain whether it will be willing and able to participate 
directly.  Since they cannot be completely sure that they own the carbon, nor can 
they be sure whether they can subsequently sell it, the benefit of such contracts is 
limited.  They will, however, discourage some landholders from participating in 
revegetation programs.  A better approach may be for an agency to waive any claim 
to carbon in revegetation on private land.  Landholders would then be free to make 
their own arrangements, should they wish and the opportunity arise.  
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Choosing not to claim carbon rights would be a safe and low cost approach 
for Murray CMA.  There would be no need to engage lawyers to develop new 
contracts, nor to subsequently defend them.  It also provides landholders with 
greater choice and flexibility.  Landholders would be willing to undertake revegetation 
agreements for a lower price given they retain the option of selling carbon – this 
could even be facilitated by putting them in contact with a specialist broker.  The 
CMA would be able to provide impartial advice about carbon and carbon markets, 
and would not itself be exposed to the vagaries of a rapidly changing international 
commodity market.  Unless it is undertaking a very large reforestation program, the 
costs of entering the carbon market are likely to exceed the benefits.  This does not 
mean that carbon should be ignored.  It can still be addressed as one of a suite of 
NRM issues and managed accordingly.  An NRM agency need not be constrained by 
what happens to be included or excluded by the CPRS, but can take a more 
comprehensive view.  
Priorities for Future Carbon Policy 
Given the importance of carbon to national accounts and international well being, an 
improved knowledge of carbon stocks and flows across the landscape is a clear 
priority, at both regional and national levels.  This will be essential for guiding future 
investment in GHG emissions mitigation and carbon sequestration, whether within 
the CPRS or through an alternative mechanism.  There are many research projects 
underway on carbon monitoring and accounting.  At the regional level, an NRM 
manager should apply the outputs of this research in order to understand carbon in 
their landscapes.  This will also identify any knowledge gaps which need to be 
addressed.  Developing a system for accurately reporting carbon in the landscape 
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should strengthen the case for future investments in the region and facilitate a rapid 
response to any future carbon market opportunities. 
Many agricultural and land management activities have been excluded from 
Australia’s CPRS until at least 2015.  This is largely because they are particularly 
difficult to accurately measure and monitor, and hence cannot be reasonably traded.  
While some of these difficulties may be overcome by research, much, if not all, of 
these sectors may still be unsuitable for inclusion.  The rules governing the CPRS 
are already highly complex, and would become very much more so if theses sectors 
were included.  A regulatory market such as the CPRS is only as effective as its 
weakest point.  The greater the range of activities that are included, the more 
complex the regulations and the greater the chance of flaws and loopholes.  In a 
competitive market such as the CPRS there will be many intelligent, motivated 
people seeking opportunities, so any weaknesses in the regulations may be rapidly 
and ruthlessly exploited.  A single flaw can threaten the integrity of the entire 
scheme.  
There is a risk of adverse social and environmental outcomes if the rural 
sector becomes too focussed on carbon.  For example, carbon-intensive plantations 
may be bad for biodiversity, support fewer jobs than agriculture, and reduce food 
security.  An alternative approach may therefore be needed to secure the many cost-
effective opportunities offered by the agricultural and NRM sectors.  Proposals have 
been made for a ‘National Carbon Bank’, a public institution which could provide 
incentives for landholders to reduce net carbon emissions while also maintaining or 
enhancing other environmental assets such as biodiversity and water.  Such a fund 
could enjoy the advantages of a market by selecting low cost, high value projects 
from those offered by landholders.  It should also avoid the potential disadvantages 
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of carbon markets by remaining focussed on high quality offsets only and also 
valuing broader social and environmental objectives.  Regional NRM agencies would 
be well placed to contribute to such a model through assessing projects and 
determining local priorities. 
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